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Abstract
Across five experiments we examined the role of valence in children’s and adults’ true and false
memories.  Using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm and either neutral or negative-
emotional lists, both adults’ (Experiment 1) and children’s (Experiment 2) true recall and
recognition was better for neutral than negative items and although false recall was also higher for
neutral items, false recognition was higher for negative items.  The last three experiments
examined adults’ (Experiment 3) and children’s (Experiments 4 and 5) one-week long-term
recognition of neutral and negative-emotional information.  The results replicated the immediate
recall and recognition findings from the first two experiments.  More important, these experiments
showed that although true recognition decreased over the one-week interval, false recognition of
neutral items remained unchanged whereas false recognition of negative-emotional items
increased.  These findings are discussed in terms of theories of emotion and memory as well as
their forensic implications.
Keywords: Valence and memory; False memory development; DRM paradigm
Valence and the Development of Immediate and Long-Term
False Memory Illusions
Our memory is a reconstructive process in which errors often occur (for an overview see
Koriat, Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000).  That means that we might falsely remember details that we
in fact did not encounter. In recent years, the development of false memories has been extensively
studied with the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger &
McDermott, 1995).  Using this paradigm, participants are presented with word lists that consist of
close semantic associates of a non-presented critical lure.  For example, a list might consist of the
words door, glass, pane, shade, ledge, sill, house, open, curtain, frame, view, breeze, sash, screen,
and shutter which are all related to the non-presented word window.  Studies have shown that
participants have the tendency to falsely recall and recognize the critical lures during subsequent
memory tests (for an overview see Gallo, 2006).  Another robust finding obtained with the DRM
paradigm is a reverse age effect.  Specifically, studies have shown that the development of
spontaneous false memories increases as a function of age (e.g., Brainerd, Reyna, & Brandse,
1995; Howe, 2005, 2006, 2008; Sugrue & Hayne, 2006).  The low levels of spontaneous false
memories found in young children may be due to a failure to automatically access associative
relations between list items and the critical lure (associative-activation theory, or AAT, e.g.,
Howe, 2005, 2008; Howe, Gagnon, & Thouas, 2008; Howe, Wimmer, & Blease, 2009a; Howe,
Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009b) or to extract gist memories across words on DRM lists
(fuzzy-trace theory, or FTT, e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2005).
Despite the robust findings produced by the DRM paradigm, researchers have questioned
the ecological validity of this paradigm (Freyd & Gleaves, 1996).  One concern raised by Freyd
and Gleaves is that in real world scenarios false memories often involve emotional events.  To
address this concern, researchers have started to create negative-emotional DRM tasks to study
the role of valence in the development of false memories.  Although only a handful of such
studies exist, findings from this line of research are important not only for their theoretical
contribution but also because of their forensic implications.  The purpose of this article is to
establish the nature of valence effects in children’s and adults’ spontaneous true and false
memories using the DRM paradigm.  In the first part, we provide an overview of what is known
about the role of valence in memory and then present two experiments in which true and false
memory (recall and recognition) for negative-emotional lists is examined.  In the second part, we
provide an overview of what is known about the role of valence in the long-term retention of
information and then present three experiments that examine the role of negative-emotional
information in the persistence of true and false memory.  To anticipate the outcome of this
exercise, both children and adults are susceptible to spontaneous false memory illusions for
negative-emotional information and these effects increase over time.  Specifically, at least for
recognition measures, negative-emotional information often produces false memories on
immediate tests of retention and, importantly, these false memory illusions become more robust
over time.  That is, whereas true recognition rates decline and false recognition of neutral critical
lures does not change with time, false recognition rates for negative-emotional information
increase over a one-week retention interval.  The theoretical and forensic consequences of these
new and unique findings will be discussed in detail at the end of this article.
Part I: False Memory Illusions and Valence
Evidence concerning the facilitative role of valence and arousal in memory is mixed.  It is
commonly thought that emotional stimuli lead to enhanced true memory performance (e.g.,
Christianson, 1992).  Indeed, some researchers have recently found that emotional information,
when presented in well-organized and coherent lists, do result in higher levels of correct recall and
recognition (e.g., Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004).  However, this may be more the exception rather
than the rule.  As it turns out, this emotional memory advantage may be restricted to conditions in
which items are presented pictorially (e.g., Talmi, Luk, McGarry, & Moscovitch, 2007; Talmi,
Schimmack, Paterson, & Moscovitch, 2007) or are presented in mixed-list formats (e.g., Dewhurst
& Parry, 2000; Hadley & MacKay, 2006).  In fact, despite a number of studies showing an
emotional memory advantage, the majority of research has shown quite the opposite.  For
example, there is considerable evidence indicating that it takes longer to generate associates to
emotionally-arousing words (Levinger & Clark, 1961) and that emotional information is not better
remembered than neutral information on immediate tests using recall measures either for adults
(for a review, see Eysenck, 1977) or children (Howe, 2007).  Indeed, it has been known for some
time that immediate memory tests (those occurring 2 to 20 minutes following study) for negative
information (e.g., words such as rape, vomit) that is arousing (as measured by galvanic skin
response) is not as good as memory for low arousal, neutral information (e.g., words such as
dance, swim) (Kleinsmith & Kaplan, 1963).  However, following a one-week retention interval,
this effect of valence/arousal is reversed.  That is, high arousal negative items are better
remembered than low arousal neutral items after a delay (for a review, see Eysenck, 1977).
Despite the fact that such findings are consistent with recent neurobiological evidence
concerning the role of emotion in consolidation and recollection (e.g., LaBar & Cabeza, 2006;
Sharot, Verfaellie, & Yonelinas, 2007), these results are difficult to replicate (for a recent review,
see Mather, 2007).  Indeed, when the various confounds are eliminated in studies such as these
(e.g., confounding item type with serial order), there is either no effect of negative emotion on
memory or the opposite effect.  That is, negative emotional items are more likely to be forgotten
than neutral items.  Unfortunately, then, this research does not allow us to draw any firm
conclusions about emotion and memory.
Interestingly, because the effects of emotion on memory are stronger and more reliable in
mixed-list than pure-list designs, some have argued that these effects are similar to those found for
distinctiveness (e.g., Schmidt, 2006; Schmidt & Saari, 2007).  That is, instead of assuming that
emotional stimuli affect attention (Christianson, 1992; Easterbrook, 1959) or encoding (e.g.,
Hadley & MacKay, 2006), emotional materials, being rare or unusual, are distinctive and are
subject to item-specific processing in memory.  For example, arousal associated with valence may
lead to increased binding of information in memory, something that enhances within-object or
item-specific memory (e.g., see Mather, 2007).  Because of this, binding should improve
recollection for the item itself but not necessarily the episodic context in which it occurred.  To
the extent that the effects of emotion and arousal on binding do not include between-item
associations, arousal may lead to better item-specific memories.  However, arousal can have a
deleterious effect on memory because it does not lead to more associations between items or
between items and their context.  To the extent that between-item associations are reduced, false
recollection rates may be similarly attenuated with emotional material.  However, because DRM
procedures are, by definition, pure-list manipulations, it is not clear whether these effects will
extend to spontaneous false memories using this popular task.
Regardless, to the extent that emotional information promotes item-specific, distinctive
processing, such material should be less susceptible to spontaneous false memory illusions.
Specifically, there is solid evidence that distinctive information leads to reduced false memory
rates in both children (e.g., Howe, 2008) and adults (e.g., Ghetti, Qin, & Goodman, 2002) using
the DRM paradigm.  In fact, false memory studies in which valence has been manipulated have
revealed that participants are less likely to falsely recall and recognize negative-emotional critical
lures as compared with neutral critical lures (e.g., Huang & Yeh, 2006; Kensinger & Corkin,
2004; Pesta, Murphy, & Sanders, 2001; but see Budson et al., 2006).  Consistent with what we
know about distinctiveness effects, the general explanation given for this finding concerns the
distinctiveness of the emotional critical lures (e.g., Kensinger & Corkin, 2004).  However, in all
of these studies except for one (Budson et al., 2006), the list items that were presented were
neutral despite their being related to either a neutral or a negative-emotional critical lure.
Negative-emotional critical lures are distinct from the list items being presented and this by itself
may have reduced false memory rates for the emotional lures.
Interestingly, Budson et al. (2006) found no differences in rates of false recognition for
emotional over neutral lists.  This raises the possibility that there is no advantage for negative-
emotional items in false recollection either.  In a recent study, Howe (2007) did find higher false
recognition (but not recall) rates for negative-emotional items than neutral items in a DRM task
with children.  Unlike Budson et al. (2006), Howe (2007) included measures of recall and, for
recognition tests, included emotional control items (items that were not presented but were related
to items on the emotional lists).  This critical control was missing from the Budson et al. (2006; a
critical limitation of this study, as the authors pointed out on p. 73) study and may be one of the
reasons that their results differed from those of Howe (2007).  (Of course, other differences
between these studies may have contributed to the different outcomes including the use of a recall
measure by Howe and the fact that Howe’s participants were 8- and 12-year-old children and
Budson et al.’s were younger and older adults.)
In order to clarify the effects of negative valence, both in children’s and adults’ false
memory illusions, we first present two experiments that compare neutral and negative-emotional
DRM lists.  In the first experiment, we examine these effects in adults when both recall and
recognition tests are used and when recognition tests also contain foils that are emotional.
Following this experiment, we present a second experiment in which the effects of emotion are
examined in children’s true and false recall and recognition.
Experiment 1:  Valence and False Memory Illusions in Adults
            The purpose to this first experiment was to obtain baseline evidence concerning adults’
false memory illusions when the studied material was negatively, emotionally charged.  We were
interested in studying these effects using both recall and recognition measures.  As well, for
recognition, non-presented emotional foils were added to the recognition lists.  We did this in
order to measure any general tendency to false alarm to emotional items that were consistent with
the lists presented originally.
Method
Participants
            The 40 participants were undergraduate students (20 males and 20 females) who
participated for course credit.
Materials and Procedure
            There were 12 DRM lists, 6 negative-emotional and 6 neutral.  The critical lures for the
emotional lists (randomly sampled from the lists used by Budson et al., 2006) were rape, danger,
anger, thief, hungry, and hell and for the neutral lists (randomly sampled from both Budson et al.,
2006, and Stadler, Roediger, & McDermott, 1999) were chair fruit, sweet, sleep, lion, and needle.
Unlike Budson et al.’s lists, which consisted of only 8 items, we added 4 items to each list making
each list 12 items long.  We did this in part to have lists of optimal length and to have enough
words so we could include emotionally-charged lures on the recognition tests.  The added items
were drawn either from Stadler et al. (1999) or by sampling related terms from the Nelson,
McEvoy, and Schreiber (1999) norms.  These additional items all exhibited rates of backward
associative strength to the critical lure that were similar to those of exiting list members.  Ten
items from each list were presented to participants, with the 11th and 12th items not being
presented and instead, were held in reserve for use as related distractors on recognition tests.  The
negative-emotional and neutral lists were equated not only on word length, but also on mean
backward associative strength (t[10] = 1.72, p = .12) and word frequency (t[10] = 1.35, p = .20)
(Leech, Rayson, & Wilson, 2001).
            The 12 lists were recorded on tape and played to the participants.  Items were presented at
a 3-second rate.  Half of the participants were presented with the emotional lists first followed by
the neutral lists and the other half were given the neutral lists first followed by the emotional
lists.1 Within each list type (emotional, neutral), lists were presented randomly one at a time.
Following the presentation of a list, participants immediately performed a distractor task (circling
random letter pairs) for 30 seconds, and were then instructed to write down as many of the words
from the list as they could remember.   Participants had a maximum of 3 minutes for recall and
then the next study-distractor-recall cycle began.  This procedure was repeated until all 12 lists
had been presented.
Immediately after the 12th list was complete, participants were given a recognition test.
The list of 72 items was presented via a tape recorder and participants simply had to mark on their
sheet (by ticking beside “yes” or “no”) whether they recognized the words from the lists or not.
The 72-item recognition test consisted of 36 targets (3 randomly sampled from each of the 12
lists), all 12 critical lures, 12 words that were semantically related to the presented lists (6 of
which were neutral and 6 of which were emotional; either the 11th or 12th unpresented list word)
but were not presented, and 12 words which were unrelated and not presented (6 of them were
neutral and 6 of them were emotional words).  Several versions of this recognition test were
created and each test was constructed so that the words appeared in random order.2
Results3
Recall
            The proportion of true and false recall scores were analyzed using separate within-subject
analyses of variance (ANOVAs).  For true recall, there was a main effect for valence, F(1, 39) =
36.99, p < .001, (p2 = .487, where neutral lists (M = .64, SD = .09) were better recalled than
negative-emotional lists (M = .55, SD = .11).  The ANOVA for false recall also produced a main
effect for valence, F(1, 39) = 11.29, p < .01, (p2 = .225, where false recall was higher for neutral
lists (M = .40, SD = .10) than for negative-emotional lists (M = .27, SD = .08).
Recognition3
            Like recall, the proportion of true and false recognition scores were analyzed using
separate ANOVAs.  The results for true recognition indicated no significant effects for valence
where true recognition of negative-emotional items (M = .83, SD = .15) was no different than that
observed for neutral items (M = .82, SD = .11).  However, for false recognition, there was a main
effect for valence, F(1, 39) = 15.38, p < .001, (p2 = .283, where negative-emotional items were
more frequently falsely recognized (M = .67, SD = .13) than neutral items (M = .51, SD = .12).
            Interestingly, when examining false alarm rates to related and unrelated foils on the
recognition test, although no valence effects were observed for unrelated foils, significantly higher
false alarm rates were found for related negative-emotional foils (M = .16, SD = .08) than for
related neutral foils (M = .10, SD = .05), F(1, 39) = 6.04, p < .02, (p2 = .134.
Discussion
The findings from this experiment are similar to those obtained by Howe (2007) with
children but are not consistent with those of Budson et al.’s (2006) study with adults.  That is, like
Howe (2007), but not Budson et al.’s (2006) findings, adults in this study were more likely to
false alarm to negative-emotional critical lures than neutral ones during the recognition test.
Moreover, when semantically related distractors were presented for both neutral and negative-
emotional lists, adults were more likely to false alarm to these distractors if they were related to
negative-emotional information than to neutral information.  Thus, despite being more likely to
correctly and falsely recall neutral information, false recognition rates are higher for negative-
emotional information than neutral information.
            Of particular interest was the finding that adults were more likely to false alarm to weakly
related, but not presented, negative-emotional items than neutral items.  This may be attributable
to the density of negative-emotional lists and that for adults, whose associative networks are well-
developed for negative-emotional information, false alarms occurred not just for strongly
activated items (the critical lures) but also for the weaker, related distractors.  Recall that measures
of backward associative strength were equivalent across negative-emotional and neutral lists
meaning that the advantage of negative-emotional information in eliciting false memory illusions
must be due to the greater intralist richness of associations (Talmi et al., 2007).  It may be that the
effects of emotionality extend to even weakly related items when recognition is used to measure
the role of emotion in false memory illusions.  Thus, consistent with the idea that negative-
emotional information is more densely integrated and more richly interconnected (e.g., Talmi et
al., 2007), it would seem that once such information becomes activated in memory there exists an
increased likelihood that most, if not all, related negative-emotional information will be primed
and become available for false recollection regardless of backward (or forward) associative
strength.  Before examining this idea further, we present data from a similar experiment with
children.
Experiment 2:  Valence and False Memory Illusions in Children
            Next we examined the effects of negative valence in children’s true and false recall and
recognition.  In particular, we wanted to see whether the effects obtained by Howe (2007) were
generally replicable and whether these effects paralleled those for adults.  Recall that like the
adults in Experiment 1, Howe (2007) found that 8- and 12-year-olds recalled more neutral words
than negative-emotional words after studying neutral and negative-emotional DRM lists.  In
addition, and again like the adults in Experiment 1, children were more likely to falsely recall
neutral critical lures than emotional critical lures.  When recognition measures were used, children
recognized neutral items more often than negative-emotional items and false recognition was
higher for negative-emotional than for neutral critical lures.
Method
Participants
            Sixty (30 males, 30 females) children, 30 7-year-olds (Mage = 7 years, 5 months; SD = 3
months) and 30 11-year-olds (Mage = 11 years, 4 months; SD = 2 months), participated in this
experiment.  The children, predominantly White and middle class, participated with parental
consent and themselves assented to the procedure on the day of testing.
Materials and Procedure
True and false recall and recognition were tested using a 2(age: 7- vs. 11-year-olds) x
2(valence: neutral vs. negative-emotional) mixed design, where age was between-subjects and
valence was within-subject (as in the first experiment).  For Experiments 2 through 4, lists were
sampled from the pool of DRM lists provided in the Appendix.  The critical lures for the
emotional lists (randomly sampled from the lists used by Budson et al., 2006) were cry, lie, anger,
thief, alone, and hell and for the neutral lists (randomly sampled from both Budson et al., 2006,
and Stadler et al., 1999) were sweet, lion, fruit, sleep, chair, and needle.  Again, as in the previous
experiment, we added additional items to each lists to achieve a length of 12 items, 10 of which
were presented and the remaining 2 used as distractors or foils in the recognition tests.  The added
items were drawn either from Stadler et al. (1999) or by sampling related terms from the Nelson et
al. (1999) norms (see Appendix).  The negative-emotional and neutral lists were equated not only
on word length, but also on mean backward associative strength and word frequency (ts(10) (
1.30, ps > .10).
For Experiment 2, 8 DRM lists were drawn from this pool, four negative-emotional (cry,
lie, anger, and thief) and four neutral (chair, sweet, lion, and sleep).  Like Experiment 1, only the
first 10 words of each list were recorded on tape and presented to the children, with the critical
lure and the 11th and 12th words not presented but used on recognition tests.  The lists were chosen
in part to once again control for levels of backward associative strength across valence and in part
to insure their appropriateness of use with children (equated on word length and frequency).
Each child was tested individually in a quiet room in their school.  The lists were
presented on audiotape at a 3-second rate per item.  Following presentation of the list, there was a
30-second distractor task (circling pairs of random letters), followed by oral recall (due to age
differences in writing speed and skill, children were not required to write their responses).  This
study-distractor-recall procedure continued until all eight lists had been presented and recalled.
For half of the children, the negative lists were presented first followed by the neutral lists, and for
the remaining half the neutral words were presented first followed by the negative lists (again, no
differences were observed as a consequence of blocking valence – see Footnote 1).
When all the lists had been presented and recalled the child was given a recognition test.
The recognition test consisted of a total of 48 words: 3 (randomly selected) words from each
presented list, all 8 critical lures, 8 related but not presented list words (4 negative-emotional and
4 neutral; either the 11th or 12th non-presented list word), and 8 unrelated but not presented words
(4 negative-emotional and 4 neutral).  The child was instructed to listen to each word on the tape
and report whether it had been on the lists read out earlier (saying “yes”) or not (saying “no”).
Results
Recall
            The proportion of true and false recall was analyzed separately using 2(age: 7- vs. 11-year-
olds) x 2(valence: neutral vs. negative-emotional) mixed ANOVAs.  For true recall, there was a
main effect for age, F(1, 58) = 30.53, p < .001, (p2 = .345, where 7-year-olds (M = .32, SD = .14)
recalled fewer items than 11-year-olds (M = .48, SD = .15), and a main effect for valence, F(1, 58)
= 86.85, p < .001, (p2 = .600, where neutral lists (M = .46, SD = .16) were better recalled than
negative-emotional lists (M = .33, SD = .12).  Similar effects were observed for false recall.
Specifically, there was a main effect for age, F(1, 58) = 5.88, p < .02, (2 = .092, where 7-year-olds
(M = .23, SD = .10) falsely recalled fewer items than 11-year-olds (M = .33, SD = .13), and a main
effect for valence, F(1, 58) = 11.01, p < .01, (p2 = .159, where neutral lists (M = .34, SD = .16)
produced more false recall than negative-emotional lists (M = .23, SD = .14).
Recognition5
            Like recall, the proportion of true and false recognition scores were analyzed using
separate ANOVAs.  For true recognition, there was a main effect age, F(1, 58) = 19.49, p < .001,
(p2 = .251, where 7-year-olds (M = .70, SD = .20) recognized fewer items than 11-year-olds (M =
.83, SD = .23), and a main effect for valence, F(1, 58) = 49.93, p < .001, (p2 = .463, where neutral
lists (M = .85, SD = .26) were better recognized than negative-emotional lists (M = .68, SD = .22).
 For false recognition, there was a main effect for age, F(1, 58) = 8.25, p < .01, (p2 = .125, where 7-
year-olds (M = .58, SD = .23) falsely recognized fewer items than 11-year-olds (M = .70, SD =
.17), and a main effect for valence, F(1, 58) = 7.85, p < .01, (2 = .119, where negative-emotional
lists (M = .68, SD = .22) produced more false recognition responses than neutral lists (M = .59,
SD = 18).  Finally, analyses of false alarm rates to related and unrelated foils on the recognition
test produced no reliable differences for children, regardless of age.
Discussion
            The results of Experiment 2 are consistent with those of Experiment 1 with adults as well
as previous research with children (Howe, 2007).  As is usual in DRM experiments, younger
children recalled and recognized fewer true and false items and this held regardless of the
emotional nature of that information (negative or neutral).  More important, children, regardless of
age, were more likely to falsely recognize negative-emotional critical lures than neutral ones,
despite being more likely to correctly recall and recognize, and falsely recall, neutral items.
Unlike adults, children’s false recognition of weakly related items did not differ as a function of
valence.  Apparently, regardless of any presumed differences in semantic density across lists,
children’s processing did not extend to these weaker associates.  This is consistent with AAT’s
assumptions concerning age differences in the structure and relative automaticity of associative
activation in children’s and adults’ knowledge base.  However, before considering possible
interpretations of this developmental difference, we present Experiments 3 through 5.
Part II: The Persistence of False Memory Illusions and Valence
            The first two experiments give a different picture of true and false recollection of negative-
emotional information than that provided by Budson et al. (2006) but one that is consistent with
previous research with children (Howe, 2007).  Together, these findings suggest that negatively
valenced information is not better remembered than neutral information.  Indeed, neutral
information was better recalled (both for adults and children) and recognized (for children, but no
difference for adults) than negative-emotional information.  However, regardless of age, children
(critical lures only) and adults (critical lures and weakly related items) were more likely to falsely
recognize negatively valenced than neutral information.
            Perhaps these different trends for true and false recollection may be the result of using
immediate testing conditions only.  Recall that earlier research has produced mixed results for
negatively valenced material – sometimes it was better recalled later than earlier and sometimes
the reverse was true (Eysenck, 1977; Mather, 2007).  Recently, LaBar and Cabeza (2006) have
indicated that memory for emotional information is better than memory for neutral information
when tested days rather than minutes following study.  That is, consistent with recent
neurobiological studies that show increases in recollection of emotional material over time (e.g.,
Sharot et al., 2007), perhaps children’s and adults’ true memory for emotional items will exceed
that for neutral items only after a delay.  Although overall rates of true memory decline with time,
perhaps the rate of this decline is attenuated for emotional material.
            What about false recollection rates over time?  Although valence has not been manipulated
in studies of false memory rates over a delay, there are several studies that have compared true
and false recollection rates over time for neutral material.  For example, McDermott (1996) found
that over a two-day delay, false recall rates exceeded true recall.  That false memories persist over
time while true memories decline is a quite robust phenomenon, having been obtained for both
recall and recognition measures (e.g., Seamon et al., 2002).  More generally, false memories are
more persistent than true memories, showing lower rates of decline between immediate and
delayed tests, than correct recollection (McDermott, 1996; Seamon et al., 2002; Thapar &
McDermott, 2001; Toglia, Neuschatz, & Goodwin, 1999).  These same false memory persistence
effects have also been obtained with children using neutral material (Brainerd et al., 1995).
            Whether negatively valenced information exhibits similar false memory persistence effects
is unknown.  However, if true memories for emotional information increase over a delay interval
(or at least the rate of decline is less than for neutral information) then it might also be the case
that false memory rates change across retention.  This is because if activation levels increase over
time (or remain relatively constant) for emotional stimuli, whereas such activation declines for
neutral stimuli, there is a greater likelihood that false recollection of negatively valenced
information should increase over that same retention interval given increased associative
activation.  Thus, for measures of false recollection, neutral information should persist in memory
whereas negative-emotional information might increase.
Experiment 3:  Valence and False Memory Persistence in Adults
            In Experiment 3, we examined the role of valence in adults’ true and false recollection
over a one-week retention interval.  To our knowledge, this is the first time emotionally-laden
stimuli have been used over a significant delay interval to examine false memory rates.  If
activation of emotional material increases over time (e.g., due to some time-dependent
neurobiological process such as consolidation – see LaBar & Cabeza, 2006; Sharot et al., 2007),
then emotional false memories should be more evident over extended delays.
Method
Participants
             The 60 participants were undergraduate students (30 males and 30 females) who
participated for course credit.
Materials and Procedure
            There were 12 DRM lists, 6 negative-emotional and 6 neutral (see Appendix).  The critical
lures for the emotional lists were cry, lie, anger, thief, alone, and hell and for the neutral lists were
sweet, lion, fruit, sleep, chair, and needle.  Again, as in the previous experiments, 10 of the 12
items were presented and the remaining 2 were used as distractors or foils in the recognition tests.
            The 12 lists were recorded on tape and played to the participants at a rate of 3-seconds per
item.  Half of the participants were presented with the emotional lists first followed by the neutral
lists and the other half were given the neutral lists first followed by the emotional lists.  Within
each list type (emotional, neutral), lists were presented randomly one at a time.  Following the
presentation of a list, participants immediately performed a distractor task (circling random letter
pairs) for 30 seconds, and were then instructed to write down as many of the words from the list
as they could remember.   Participants had a maximum of 3 minutes for recall and then the next
study-distractor-recall cycle began.  This procedure was repeated until all 12 lists had been
presented.
Immediately after the 12th list was complete, half of the participants (N = 30) were given a
recognition test.  The remaining half of the participants (N = 30) were given the recognition test
one-week later.  Regardless of when the recognition test was administered, the list of 72 items was
presented via a tape recorder and participants simply had to mark on their sheet (by ticking beside
“yes” or “no”) whether they recognized the words from the lists or not.  As in Experiment 1, the
72-item recognition test consisted of 36 targets (3 randomly sampled from each of the 12 lists), all
12 critical lures, 12 words that were semantically related to the presented lists (6 of which were
neutral and 6 of which were emotional) but were not presented, and 12 words which were
unrelated and not presented (6 of them were neutral and 6 of them were emotional words).
Several versions of this recognition test were created and each test was constructed so that the
words appeared in random order.
Results
Recall
            The proportion of true and false recall was analyzed separately using two within-subject
ANOVAs.  For true recall, there was a main effect for valence, F(1, 58) = 15.14, p < .01, (p2 =
.231, where neutral lists (M = .62, SD = .13) were better recalled than negative-emotional lists
(M = .54, SD = .16).  Similar effects were observed for false recall.  Specifically, there was a main
effect for valence, F(1, 58) = 11.01, p < .01, (p2 = .159, where neutral lists (M = .30, SD = .11)
produced more false recall than negative-emotional lists (M = .20, SD = .10).
Recognition
            Recognition data were analyzed using a 2(item: true vs. false) x 2(valence: neutral vs.
negative-emotional) x 2(time of test: immediate vs. 1-week) ANOVA where the first two
variables were within-subject and the latter variable between-subjects.  The results revealed a
main effect for item, F(1, 36) = 10.41, p < .01, (p2 = .224, where true recognition (M = .80, SD =
.18) exceeded false recognition (M = .66, SD = .14).  Although like Experiment 1, immediate false
recognition rates were higher for negative-emotional than neutral critical lures, there was an Item
x Valence x Time of test interaction, F(1, 36) = 9.87, p < .01, (p2 = .163.  As can be seen in Figure
1, and was confirmed in a series of post-hoc tests (p < .05), for neutral lists, true recognition rates
fell and false recognition rates did not change significantly, across the retention interval (Figure 1,
Panel A).  However, for negative-emotional lists, although true recognition rates fell (and did so
more dramatically than for neutral items), false recognition rates increased across the retention
interval (Figure 1, Panel B).  Thus, as predicted, although true recognition rates declined over
time, false memories either persisted (neutral items) or increased (emotional items).
Discussion
The results of this experiment are generally consistent with the previous two experiments.
That is, neutral information was better recalled than emotional information and the same effects
were observed for false recall.  Although there were marginal valence effects at immediate
recognition (negative items better recognized than neutral items) as in the previous experiments,
there were no valence differences in true recognition rates at one week and false recognition rates
either remained the same (for neutral items), replicating previous research on false memory
persistence effects, or increased (for emotional items) representing a hitherto unreported effect.
These findings have important theoretical as well as forensic implications.  That negative-
emotional true memories were no better recognized than neutral ones and that both declined
following a one-week retention interval, but false emotional memories increased over this same
interval whereas neutral false memories remained unchanged, suggests that activation levels
change differently for presented and unpresented information as a function of valence and time.
Before discussing the implications of these effects, we present the results for these same
manipulations with children.
Experiments 4 and 5:  Valence and False Memory Persistence in Children
The aim of these final two experiments was to examine the effect of valence on children’s
long-term true and false memory.   In both experiments, children were presented with neutral and
negative-emotional DRM lists.  All children were involved in an immediate free recall task and
one recognition test, either immediately or one-week later.  Experiment 4 tested young (5- and 8-




Thirty (16 male, 14 female) children took part in the experiment, 15 5-year-olds (M = 5.67
years, SD = .5) and 15 8-year-olds (M = 7.54 years, SD = .45).  All of the children were fluent
speakers of English, were predominately White, middle-class and all participated following
parental consent and their own assent on the day of testing.
Materials and Procedure
Four neutral (chair, lion, sleep, and sweet) and four negative-emotional (anger, cry, lie,
and thief) word lists (see Appendix) were used in this experiment. Each list contained 12 items,
the top 10 associates being used at study (with the remaining 2 used in the recognition tests – see
below).  Again, all of the words were matched across lists for length and frequency and were
equated for mean backward associative strength (all ts < 1).
Each child was tested individually and was told that they were going to hear a series of
words, which they should try to remember.  The lists were presented on audiotape at a rate of one
word every 3 seconds.  For half of the children, the emotional lists were presented first and for the
other half, the neutral lists were presented first.  After each list of words was presented, the child
was given a distractor task (circling random pairs of letters) for 30 seconds prior to recall.   This
study-distractor-recall procedure was repeated until all 8 lists had been presented.
After all of the lists had been presented and recalled by the children, half of the participants were
given an immediate recognition test and the remaining children were given the recognition test
one week later.  The recognition test was audio recorded and children simply indicated “yes” if
the word had been presented earlier and “no” if the word had not appeared earlier.  The 48-item
recognition test consisted of the 8 critical lures, 24 targets (3 randomly selected from each of the 8
lists), 8 semantically-related distractors (i.e., one unpresented item from each list that occurred in




            The proportion of true and false recall was analyzed separately using two 2(age: 5- vs. 8-
year-olds) x 2(valence: neutral vs. negative-emotional) ANOVAs where the first factor was
between-subjects and the last factor was within-subject.  For true recall, there was a main effect
for age, F(1, 28) = 15.75, p < .001, (p2 = .335, where older children correctly recalled more items
(M = . 34, SD = .21) than younger children (M = .23, SD = .14), and a main effect for valence,
F(1, 28) =21.95, p < .001, (p2 = .453, where neutral lists (M = .32, SD = .18) were better recalled
than negative-emotional lists (M = .25, SD = .13).  Similar effects were observed for false recall.
Specifically, there was a main effect for age, F(1, 28) = 20.86, p < .001, (p2 = .425, where older
children falsely recalled more critical lures (M = .28, SD = .10) than younger children (M = .12,
SD = .09), and a main effect for valence, F(1, 28) = 28.85, p < .001, (p2 = .497, where neutral lists
(M = .25, SD = .10) produced more false recall of critical lures than negative-emotional lists (M =
.10, SD = .06).
Recognition
            Recognition data was analyzed using a 2(age: 5- vs. 8-year-olds) x 2(time of test:
immediate vs. 1-week) x 2(item: true vs. false) x 2(valence: neutral vs. negative-emotional)
ANOVA where the first two variables were between-subjects and the last two variables were
within-subject.  The results revealed a main effect for age, F(1, 28) = 15.87, p < .001, (p2 = .324,
where older children (M = .72, SD = .23) were better at recognition than younger children (M =
.54, SD = .17).  Although there were no differences as a function of valence for immediate false
recognition rates, there was an Item x Valence x Time of test interaction, F(1, 28) = 14.13, p <
.01, (p2 = .200.  As can be seen in Figure 2, and was confirmed in a series of post-hoc tests (p <
.05), for neutral lists, true recognition rates fell and false recognition rates did not change
significantly, across the retention interval (Figure 2, Panel A).  However, for negative-emotional
lists, although true recognition rates fell (and unlike adults, did so at the same rate as true neutral
information), false recognition rates increased across the retention interval (Figure 2, Panel B).
These effects did not vary with age and, like the findings for adults in Experiment 3, show that
although true recognition rates decline across time, false recognition rates remain stable (neutral
information) or actually increase (emotional information) over a 1-week retention interval.  Before
elaborating on the theoretical and forensic implications of these findings, we describe the effects
of these same manipulations with older children in Experiment 5.
Experiment 5: Method
Participants
This study involved 80 (38 females, 42 males) children from schools in The Netherlands,
40 7-year-olds (M = 7.47 years, SD = .57) and 40 11-year-olds (M = 11.72 years, SD = .58).
Children participated after parents had given their written informed consent and each child’s
assent at the time of testing.  Children were tested individually and were given a small present in
return for their participation.
Materials and Procedure
            For the neutral word lists, five critical lures (bread, window, sweet, smoke, and foot) were
selected from Peters, Jelicic, and Merckelbach’s (2007) norming study.  For the emotional word
lists, five critical lures (murder, pain, punishment, death, and cry) were chosen and lists
generated.  List items were selected from the Dutch word association norms (Van Loon-Vervoorn
& Van Bekkum, 1991).  All lists contained 12 items, but only the top 10 associates were presented
at study (the others were used as distractors in the recognition tests – see below).  All items were
presented in order of associative strength, from strongest to weakest.  Using the Celex lexical
database (Centre for Lexical Information, 1995), it was established that the mean word frequency
of neutral and emotional critical lures did not differ (t(8) = 0.22, n.s.).  Likewise, the mean
backward associative strength between the neutral list items and their critical lures and the mean
backward associative strength between the emotional list items and their critical lures did not
differ (t(8) = 1.69, n.s.).
Children were tested individually.  The experiment consisted of two phases. In the first
phase, children were exposed to each word list followed by a distractor task followed by recall.
During the second phase, children engaged in a recognition task.  Children were instructed to
listen to the words carefully and to recall as many words as possible after each list. Lists were
presented on an audio recording at a rate of one word every 3 seconds.  List order was
counterbalanced so that half of the children were presented with the neutral lists first whereas the
other half listened to the emotional lists first.  After each list and before free recall, children were
involved in a 30 second distractor task.  Following presentation of the 10th list, half of the children
of each age group (N = 40) were administered a yes-no recognition task (immediate recognition
group).  The remaining half of the children in each age group (N = 40) completed the recognition
task following a one-week delay (delayed recognition group).  The 78-item recognition task
consisted of the 10 critical lures, 40 studied items (i.e., 4 items from each list), 10 semantically-
related distractors (i.e., one unpresented 11th or 12th word from each list), 6 unrelated neutral
distractors (e.g., castle) taken from unstudied lists from Peters et al. (2007), 6 unrelated negative




The first step in the analysis was to examine children’s proportions of true and false recall.
 True and false recall data were analyzed separately using two 2(Age: 7- vs. 11-year-olds) x 2
(Valence: neutral vs. negative-emotional) ANOVAs where the first factor was between-subjects
and the latter factor within-subject.  For true recall, the analyses revealed a significant main effect
for age, F(1, 78) = 119.09,  p < .001, (p2 = .604, where 7-year-olds (M = .34, SD = .15) recalled
fewer items than 11-year-olds (M = .54, SD = .22), and a significant main effect for valence, F(1,
78) = 19.73, p < .001, (p2 = .202, where neutral words (M = .46, SD = .16) were better recalled
than negative-emotional words (M = .42, SD = .15).
For false recall the analysis also showed significant main effects of age, F(1, 78) = 28.80,
p < .001, (p2 = .270, where 7-year-olds (M = .17, SD = .09) falsely recalled fewer critical lures
than 11-year-olds (M = .35, SD = .15), and list valence, F(1, 78) = 11.67, p =  .001, (p2 = .130,
where neutral lists elicited false recall of more critical lures (M = .31, SD = .17) than did negative-
emotional lists (M = .20, SD = .11).
Recognition
Recognition data were analyzed using a 2(age: 7- vs. 11-year-olds) x 2(time of test:
immediate vs. 1-week) x 2(item: true vs. false) x 2(valence: neutral vs. negative-emotional)
ANOVA where the first two variables were between-subjects and the last two variables were
within-subject.  The results revealed a main effect for age, F(1, 76) = 93.30, p < .001, (p2 = .551,
where younger, 7-year-old children correctly recognized fewer items (M = .56, SD = .16) than
older, 11-year-old children (M = .72, SD = .21).  The only other significant effect was an Item x
Time of test interaction, F(1, 76) = 7.76, p < .01, (p2 = .093, where post-hoc tests (p < .05) showed
that true recognition (M = .69, SD = .17) was higher than false recognition (M = .62, SD = .15) on
immediate tests, but false recognition (M = .69, SD = .24) was higher than true recognition (M =
.60, SD = .14) on 1-week tests.  Although the 3-way Item x Valence x Time of test interaction was
not significant in the overall ANOVA, Bonferroni tests (p < .05) did reveal significant differences
in true and false recognition rates due to valence and time.  As shown in Figure 3, true recognition
rates did decrease over time for both neutral and negative-emotional items and, like Experiment 4,
did so at similar rates (Panel A).  For false recognition (Figure 3, Panel B), performance on
neutral items remained the same across time whereas for negative-emotional items, false
recognition of critical lures increased over the 1-week retention interval.  Thus, like the children in
Experiment 4 and the adults in Experiment 3, 7- and 11-year-olds’ true memory declined with
time but their false recollection rates either remained unchanged (neutral information) or
increased (negative-emotional information) over a 1-week delay.  The theoretical and forensic
ramifications of these findings will be discussed next in the context of the other four experiments.
General Discussion
The aim of these experiments was to examine the role of valence in the development and
retention of children’s and adults’ true and false memories.  Several key findings emerged, some
of which replicate developmental trends found previously for neutral materials and extend these
findings to emotional material.  More important, several new and hitherto unreported effects
emerged, ones having to do with the effects of emotional material on long-term retention of true
and false memories.
First, our findings replicate previous developmental DRM studies inasmuch as (a) younger
children’s true and false recollection was generally poorer than older children’s, (b) all children
correctly and falsely recalled more neutral items than negative-emotional items, and (c) all
children tended to correctly recognize more neutral than negative-emotional items, but, on
average, falsely recognized more negative-emotional than neutral items.
Second, the current findings extend these outcomes to adults.  That is, adults correctly and
falsely recalled more neutral than negative-emotional items, tended to correctly recognize more
neutral than negative items, but falsely recognized more negative-emotional than neutral items.
These findings are also consistent with a recent study in which negative items were more
frequently falsely recognized than neutral or positive items even when arousal levels were
controlled (Brainerd, Stein, Silveira, Rohenkohl, & Reyna, 2008).  Together, these outcomes
suggest that valence, independent of arousal, contributes to false memory production and that the
role of valence in false memory may be developmentally invariant.  Although adults in the current
experiments tended to false alarm to both strong (critical lures) and weak associates in the
recognition task whereas children false alarmed only to the critical lure, this difference more
quantitative rather than qualitative.
This developmentally invariant pattern was also observed for our third and perhaps most
important set of findings, namely, the presence of false memory persistence for neutral items but
the unmistakable “growth” of false memory for negative-emotional information.  That is, for both
children and adults, false memories for neutral critical lures remained stable over a one-week
retention interval whereas false memories for critical lures increased for negative-emotional
material.  This despite the fact that true recognition rates declined for both neutral and negative-
emotional information.  For children, these rates diminished at the same rate for both neutral and
negative information whereas for adults, true recognition declined more rapidly for negative-
emotional than neutral material.
            These new findings have important implications for understanding the effects of negative-
emotional information on children’s and adults’ true and false memories, immediately and in the
long-term.  In contrast to what would have been anticipated on the basis of the research literature
concerning memory advantages for emotional stimuli (e.g., Kensinger, 2007; Talmi &
Moscovitch, 2004; Talmi et al., 2007), both children and adults were better at recalling neutral
than emotional items.  However, consistent with that literature, both children and adults were
more likely to falsely recall neutral critical lures than negative-emotional critical lures. The
finding that fewer false memories were produced for negative-emotional information than for
neutral information using recall measures also corresponds with previous work that has shown
that negative emotion leads to fewer reconstructive-memory errors than positive emotion (e.g.,
Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Levin & Bluck, 2004).
However, lower false recollection rates for negatively valenced information appears to be
limited to recall measures.  That is, although true recognition rates were frequently higher for
neutral than negative-emotional information, unlike recall, false recognition tended to be higher
for negative-emotional information and this effect increased over a one-week retention interval.
This finding is difficult to reconcile with the idea that emotional material increases memory
accuracy.
Of course, we are not the first to report differences in false recollection rates that depend
on how memory is being measured, recall tests versus recognition tests (e.g., see Dewhurst, Barry,
Swannell, Holmes, & Bathurst, 2007).  Moreover, although some studies have found that emotion
enhances correct recognition accuracy (e.g., Ochsner, 2000), a number of others found no
advantage for emotional material (Comblain, D’Argembeau, Van der Linden, & Aldenhoff, 2004;
Pesta et al., 2001; Windmann & Kutas, 2001), and still others have found lower recognition
accuracy for negative than neutral words (Maratos, Allen, & Rugg, 2000).  Our findings add to the
growing consensus that when pure-list designs are used, negative-emotional material does not
enjoy an advantage in true recall or recognition relative to neutral words.  Indeed, neutral words
are better recalled and recognized than negative-emotional ones.
            Interestingly, these same trends hold for false recall – that is, false recall is more likely for
neutral than negative items.  However, the reverse was observed for false recognition – that is,
false recognition was more likely for negative than neutral items.  More important, although false
recognition of neutral items shows the classic persistence effect across a one-week retention
interval for both children and adults, false recognition for negative information actually increased
over that same interval.
            This pattern of findings might be consistent with predictions from fuzzy-trace theory
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2005).  Specifically, it could be argued that because valenced (either positive
or negative) information produces relatively more gist than neutral information (see Rivers,
Reyna, & Mills, 2008), true recall and recognition should be better for neutral than negative lists.
This is because true memories are often based on verbatim information whereas false memories
are almost always gist-based (see Brainerd & Reyna, 2005).  As well, according to FTT, because
gist processing may be more likely with negative items, such items would be expected to more
readily invoke false memories than neutral items.  This prediction is partially confirmed in our
results.  However, when there were more false memories for negative than neutral items, this
outcome was restricted to measures of recognition not recall.  Because gist processing is more
likely on recall tests because they involve more reconstruction than recognition measures, FTT
can only provide a partial explanation of the current findings.  Moreover, because true and false
recollective processes are dissociated in FTT, it is not clear how lower true and false recall for
negative items, along with higher true and false recall for neutral items, can be reconciled within
this model.
However, recently, Brainerd et al. (2008) showed that when it comes to negatively
valenced information, meaning-based processing might play more of a role than previously
expected even on recognition tests.  Specifically, they found that participants were more likely to
accept critical lures for negative than neutral or positive information and that these errors were
based on familiarity (meaning) judgements.  Not only might this explain our immediate
recognition findings but might also provide an account of our long-term retention findings.
Because verbatim traces decay more rapidly than gist traces, FTT anticipates that false memories
for negative items should be more robust than those for neutral items.  Given that FTT can
accommodate the false memory persistence effect with neutral items, it may not be too difficult to
see how it can also accommodate for the increase in false recognition rates over time.  That is, gist-
rich material (negative items) may also give rise to more stable gist, one that continues to foment
over time.  If so, then false recognition rates for negatively valenced information should increase
with time.  Thus, according to FTT, for negative information, it is the meaning content of critical
lures that becomes increasingly familiar to participants while at the same time they are less able to
use verbatim information to suppress false acceptance of critical lures.  This may not only explain
the differences we observed between recall and recognition measures in our experiments, but also
account for the differences in “growth” rates over time for false recollections of negative but not
neutral information.
            Alternatively, associative-activation theory (e.g., Howe, 2006; Howe et al., 2009a, 2009b)
can also provide an account of these findings.  Specifically, although neutral and negative-
emotional lists were equated on backward associative strength, as noted earlier, these lists may
have differed in semantic density such that emotional lists contained more intralist cohesion than
neutral lists (e.g., Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004).  In fact, when measured across the lists used in the
five experiments in this article, semantic density was twice as large, and significantly higher, in
the emotional (M = .15) than neutral (M = .07) lists (t[10] = 2.48, p < .05).  Higher levels of
semantic density may confer greater confusability between what was and what was not presented
because items are more interrelated, a phenomenon that was well captured in a network model
depicting the influence of emotion on associative processing a number of decades ago (Bower,
1981).  However, such confusion may be limited to measures of recognition where items are
already generated for participants, but not on tasks (e.g., free recall) where participants must
generate information themselves.  Indeed, as already mentioned, it is well known that false
memory production can depend critically on how memory is tested, particularly on whether one
uses recall or recognition tests (e.g., Dewhurst et al., 2007).  This would explain why such effects
were restricted to recognition measures of false memory and not recall measures.
In addition, because semantically dense lists are more cohesive, they are more likely to
maintain their stability in memory over time.  Indeed, over time, negative-emotional lists might
give rise to higher rates of false recognition because consolidation of emotional material is a more
protracted process (e.g., Sharot et al., 2007) or because participants adopt a more lenient response
criterion on recognition tasks, both initially as well as after a long-term retention interval.  Indeed,
semantically dense lists (e.g., ones containing emotional stimuli) do not enhance recognition
accuracy, but rather, engender a more liberal response criterion (Dougal & Rotello, 2007), one
that might lead to greater false recognition responses over time.
Conclusion
            Regardless of which theory provides the best explanation, the current experiments have
produced a series of consistent and hitherto unreported findings concerning children’s and adults’
processing of emotional material.  Indeed, there were three key, developmentally invariant
findings: (1) more neutral than negative-emotional information was correctly recalled and
recognized, a result that is consistent with previous research contrasting the use of pure- rather
than mixed-list designs; (2) more neutral than negative-emotional information was falsely recalled
but more negative-emotional than neutral information was falsely recognized; and (3) regardless
of valence, true recognition rates declined over time but false recognition rates either remained
unchanged (neutral lists) or actually increased over time (negative-emotional lists).  Findings 2
and 3 are consistent with the literature showing that emotional information may be semantically
denser than neutral information and that this may promote greater longevity of emotional
memories and a more liberal response bias on recognition tests.
There are at least two important take-home messages.  The first is that whether emotional
information is more likely to produce false memory illusions in children and adults seems to
depend on whether one administers a recall or recognition test, a finding not unheard of in the
false memory literature (e.g., Dewhurst et al., 2007) and one that replicates earlier findings
concerning children’s spontaneous false memory production (Howe, 2007).  The second is that
unlike false memory illusions for neutral material, memory illusions that tend to persist over a one-
week retention interval, false memory illusions for negative-emotional information tend to
increase over that same interval.
            Both of these messages may have forensic implications.  First, consistent with claims by
some (e.g., Freyd & Gleaves, 1996), it is important to examine emotional information when
developing a more complete theory of false memory illusions in children and adults.  In fact, the
current research has produced some findings that may be potentially worrisome, ones that have
some rather daunting implications.  For example, consider the findings that (a) true recollection of
negative events is not always better than that for neutral events and (b) false memories increase
for negative-emotional information over time.  Taken together, the results suggest that memories
for negative experiences may not always be well recollected and, in fact, may be more, not less,
susceptible to increases in false memory production over time.
            Of course, there are concerns with whether findings from research using word lists
generalizes to more typical forensic situations in which entire events are being (mis)remembered
(e.g., Pezdek & Lam, 2007).  Moreover, to the extent that recollection of “real-life”
autobiographical events is more frequently recall-based than recognition-based, the concerns
expressed here about growth of false recollection over time may be moot.  However, if
autobiographical recollection is (a) cued, as it often is when looking at old photographs or talking
to others about the past or (b) subsequent introspection about past events involves cuing or
recognition-like prompts (e.g., answering specific yes/no questions about the remembered event),
there may be some legitimacy to findings from word-list studies such as these that show greater
false recollection over time when recognition-like memory prompts are used.  Moreover, it should
be pointed out that the current results correspond well with other recent findings in which entire
events are implanted.  For example, there is some evidence that valenced events are more readily
implanted in children’s memory than more mundane or neutral events (Otgaar, Candel, &
Merckelbach, 2008).  Thus, although procedures used to investigate spontaneous false memories
differ from those used to examine implanted false memories, it does seem that the results are
similar – that is, negative-emotional material, regardless of whether it consists of a word list (the
current research; Brainerd et al., 2008; Howe, 2007) or an entire event narrative (e.g., Otgaar et
al., 2008; for an overview, see Loftus, 2004), is more vulnerable to false memory illusions than
neutral material.  Indeed, it may be that the same underlying mechanisms are responsible for false
memory illusions regardless of one’s paradigm of preference (also see Wade et al., 2007).
            Finally, it is important to note that not only might the same mechanism underlie the
construction of spontaneous and implanted false memories, but this same mechanism may be
responsible for false memory production regardless of age.  Recall that despite age-related
increases in both true and false memory rates, a finding typical in this area of research (see
Brainerd & Reyna, 2005), increased susceptibility to false memory illusions in recognition but not
recall of negative-emotional information was developmentally invariant.  That is, regardless of
age, children and adults were more likely to falsely recognize negatively valenced items than
neutral ones and this effect increased over the long-term retention interval.  That children and
adults differ quantitatively but not qualitatively is important and argues that similar mechanisms
are involved in false memory illusions throughout development.
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APPENDIX
  List Pool for English Words used in Experiments 2-4 (Critical lures in CAPs)
Negative-Emotional Lists
CRY                LIE                  ANGER          HELL              THIEF             ALONE
Tears                Fib                  Mad                 Devil               Steal                Single
Sad                  Cheat               Fear                 Satan               Robber            Isolated
Tissue              Truth               Hate                 Evil                 Crook              Abandoned
Sorrow             False               Rage                Damned           Burglar           Solitary
Eyes                 Mislead           Temper           Sin                   Money             Apart
Weep               Trick                Fury                Lucifer            Cop                  Lonesome
Sob                  Fake                Wrath               Demon            Bad                 Separate
Bawl                Sneak              Fight                Heaven            Rob                 Quiet
Frown              Pretend            Hatred                         Soul                 Jail                  Detached
Unhappy          Deceive           Mean               Judgment        Gun                 Solo
Upset               Secret              Calm                Beast               Bank               Self
Down               Honest            Enrage             Fire                  Bandit                         Unaided
Neutral Lists
FRUIT             CHAIR           SWEET           LION               NEEDLE        SLEEP
Apple               Table               Sour                Tiger               Thread             Bed
Vegetable        Sit                    Candy                         Circus              Pin                   Rest
Orange             Leg                  Sugar              Jungle              Eye                  Awake
Pear                 Seat                  Bitter              Tamer              Sewing            Tired
Banana             Couch                         Good               Den                  Sharp              Dream
Berry               Desk                Taste                Cub                 Point               Wake
Cherry             Sofa                 Tooth               Africa                         Prick                Snooze
Basket              Cushion          Nice                 Mane               Thimble          Blanket
Juice                Sitting              Honey                         Cage                Haystack         Doze
Salad                Stool               Chocolate        Feline              Thorn              Slumber
Bowl                Bench              Pie                  Hunt                Cloth                Yawn
Cocktail           Rocking          Heart                Pride               Knitting           Drowsy
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Footnotes
1No differences were found as a consequence of whether emotional lists appeared first or second.
Because different orders were constructed for methodological not theoretical reasons, the data
were collapsed across order for all of the analyses reported in this article.
2No differences were found across the various versions of the recognition tests.  Because these
different versions were constructed for methodological not theoretical reasons, the data were
collapsed across test version for all of the analyses reported in this article.
3
 Across all five experiments in this article, there were no effects of blocking or gender.  As there
were no theoretical hypotheses concerning these variables in this article, and because neither
variable affected performance, they were not included in subsequent analyses for any of the
experiments.
4Throughout this article, it is important to note that the recognition findings were unaffected by
the prior recall test.  That is, when recognition probabilities were conditionalized on whether an
item had been recalled earlier, the patterns of findings were no different than when the
unconditional recognition probabilities were analyzed (for similar findings, see Marche, Brainerd,
Lane, & Loehr, 2005).  In addition, using a separate but smaller sample of 5-, 7-, and 11-year-olds
and adults, we examined recognition performance without an intervening recall test.  Analyses of
these data showed the same pattern of results as the ones reported here that were preceded by a
recall test.
5For Experiments 2, 4, and 5 involving children, the recognition results were the same regardless
of whether raw scores or A( was used in the analyses (for a discussion of the use of signal
detection analyses, see Pastore, Crawley, Berens, & Skelly, 2003).  Because there were no
differences in the outcome of the analyses, and because we report the raw score recognition
findings for adults in Experiments 1 and 3, we report the untransformed, raw score analyses for
the recognition data from all participants across the five experiments in this article.
Figure Captions
Figure 1. Adults’ true and false recognition rates as a function of valence and time of test in
Experiment 3.
Figure 2. Children’s true and false recognition rates as a function of valence and time of test in
Experiment 4.
Figure 3. Children’s true and false recognition rates as a function of valence and time of test in
Experiment 5.
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